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Introduction
ON AUGUST 11, 2011, BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT (“BART”) au-
thorities shut down mobile phone and Internet access1 in an attempt
to disrupt planned protests over the July 3, 2011 fatal shooting of
Charles Hill by BART police.2 That day, Internet access and cell ser-
vice was silenced in four downtown San Francisco stations for three
hours during the height of the evening commute (the “BART restric-
tion”).3 According to BART, during the preceding week organized ac-
tivists4 had planned to use social media sites to coordinate protests
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1. See Elinor Mills, SF Subway Muzzles Cell Service During Protest, CNET NEWS (Aug. 12,
2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20091822-245/s.f-subway-muzzles-cell-service-
during-protest/?part=rss&subj=news&tag=2547-1_3-0-20; Bay Area Rapid Transit Accused of
Censorship for Blocking Wireless Services to Foil Protests, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Aug. 15, 2011),
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/8/16/bay_area_rapid_transit_accused_of.
2. See Kevin Fagan, Man shot to death by BART officer identified, S.F. CHRON. (July 7,
2011), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Man-shot-to-death-by-BART-officer-identi-
fied-2355477.php; Chris Roberts, BART Officer Who Killed Homeless Man Cleared of Wrongdo-
ing, NBC BAY AREA (July 10, 2012), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/BART-
Officer-Who-Killed-Homeless-Man-Cleared-of-Wrongdoing-161971485.html.
3. See Mills, supra note 1.
4. The most infamous of these groups, Anonymous, later claimed responsibility for
hacking BART’s website and stealing personal BART employee information. See Casey
Newton, BART Website Hacked, Customer Info Leaked, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 14, 2011), http://
www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/BART-website-hacked-customer-info-leaked-2335175.
php.
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and disrupt BART service.5 Since the incident, BART has offered both
safety and prevention of lawless activity as justifications for curtailing
mobile Internet access, but both the media and legal advocacy groups
have challenged the BART restriction as unlawful and
unconstitutional.6
The outcry was fueled in part because of recent social movements
around the world. Across the globe, 2011 was the year of “Twitter revo-
lutions.”7 Rebellions in many Arab states, especially Egypt and Tuni-
sia, leveraged social media to coordinate and execute demonstrations
and full-blown political coups.8 Governments responded with Internet
censorship measures, including former Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak’s decision to “switch off” Egypt’s Internet.9 Our western legal
framework is typically averse to this sort of absolute and totalitarian
speech restriction, but the possibility of rampant Internet censorship
drew closer to home when riots across the United Kingdom prompted
Prime Minister David Cameron to suggest a protest-disruption strategy
that included censoring access to social media sites.10 Similarly, U.S.
legislators have recently weighed the propriety of granting the Presi-
dent an Internet “kill-switch” for use against cyber warfare.11
Within this framework, the reality of absolute Internet censorship
measures suggests the significance of the BART restriction. While
5. See Bay Area Rapid Transit, Statement on temporary wireless service interruption
in select BART stations on Aug. 11 (Aug. 12, 2011, 1:08 PM) http://www.bart.gov/news/
articles/2011/news20110812.aspx [hereinafter BART statement].
6. See Mills, supra note 1; Harold Feld, Why Shutting Down Cell Service Is Not Just Against
The Law, It’s a Really Bad Idea, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.publicknow
ledge.org/blog/why-shutting-down-cell-service-not-just-again; Eva Galperin, BART Pulls a
Mubarak in San Francisco, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 12, 2011), https://www.eff.
org/deeplinks/2011/08/bart-pulls-mubarak-san-francisco.
7. See, e.g., Mathew Ingram, Was What Happened In Tunisia a Twitter Revolution?,
GIGAOM (Jan. 14, 2011), http://gigaom.com/2011/01/14/was-what-happened-in-tunisia-a-
twitter-revolution/; John Hudson, The ‘Twitter Revolution’ Debate: The Egyptian Test Case, AT-
LANTIC WIRE (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2011/01/the-twitter-
revolution-debate-the-egyptian-test-case/21296/#.
8. See Ingram, supra note 7; Hudson, supra note 7.
9. See Ryan Singel, Egypt Shut Down Its Net With a Series of Phone Calls, WIRED (Jan. 28,
2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/01/egypt-isp-shutdown/.
10. Coincidentally, the UK riots occurred in the week preceding the BART restric-
tion, and Prime Minister Cameron proposed his censorship policy on the same day as the
BART protest and mobile Internet shutoff. See Josh Halliday, David Cameron considers ban-
ning suspected rioters from social media, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.guardian.
co.uk/media/2011/aug/11/david-cameron-rioters-social-media; Craig Johnson, S.F. Sub-
way System Admits Cutting Cellphone Service to Stop Planned Protest, CNN THIS JUST IN BLOG
(Aug. 13, 2011), http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/13/s-f-subway-system-admits-cut-
ting-cellphone-service-to-stop-planned-protest/.
11. See S. 3480, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010).
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BART maintains its interruption of wireless Internet service is consis-
tent with the First Amendment12, the facts surrounding the BART re-
striction may shed light on a developing area of First Amendment
jurisprudence. In the days and weeks following the incident, legal
scholars and First Amendment advocates opined on the constitution-
ality of the BART restriction, but no clear consensus has emerged.13
While no formal action has been filed challenging the BART restric-
tion’s constitutionality, some lawmakers have taken steps to prevent
such an occurrence in the future. For example, earlier this year Cali-
fornia State Senator Alex Padilla spearheaded a bill through commit-
tee that would require California agencies to obtain a court order
before interrupting wireless services.14 Similarly, a Chicago alderman
proposed an ordinance limiting law enforcement’s power to interrupt
wireless access.15
Despite these legislative proposals, there has been little discourse
on the underlying constitutionality of the BART restriction. In a hum-
ble attempt to address this, this Comment explores two questions.
First, did BART violate the First Amendment when it temporarily
blocked mobile Internet access?16 Second, to the extent our present
12. See Bay Area Rapid Transit, Cell Service Interruption Policy (Dec. 1, 2012), http:/
/www.bart.gov/docs/final_CSIP.pdf.
13. Compare Eugene Volokh, An Unusual (But Likely Constitutional) Speech Restriction,
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 13, 2011), http://volokh.com/2011/08/13/an-unusual-
but-likely-constitutional-speech-restriction/ (arguing the BART Restriction is permissible
under the First Amendment), with Justin Silverman, BART Phone Blackout: Did the S.F.
Transit Agency Violate Free Speech Protections?, SUFFOLK MEDIA LAW (Aug. 27, 2011), http://
suffolkmedialaw.com/2011/08/27/bart-phone-blackout-did-the-s-f-transit-agency-violate-
free-speech-protections/ (arguing the BART Restriction is likely impermissible under the
First Amendment).
14. See S.B. 1160, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2012) (requiring government agencies to
obtain a court order before shutting down cellular phone access); Wyatt Buchanan, Bill
bars cell service shutdown by public agencies, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.sfgate.
com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2012/04/18/MNQM1O5B1R.DTL.
15. See Don Babwin, Chicago Asked Not to Stifle Wireless at Summits, THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9SU230O0.htm.
16. A quick note on scope: As mentioned above, the BART restriction suggests nu-
merous legal issues. For example, there has been at least one complaint filed with the FCC
challenging BART’s restriction under the Communications Act. See, e.g., Public Knowledge,
Emergency Petition for Declaratory Ruling, RM-___ (FCC Aug. 29, 2011), available at http:/
/www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/publicinterestpetitionFCCBART.pdf. Since this pe-
tition, the FCC has issued a notice requesting public comment on “intentional interrup-
tions of Commercial Mobile Radio Service.” Commission Seeks Comment On Certain Wireless
Service Interruptions, Public Notice, DA 12-311 (FCC 2012); see also Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Asks
for Input on Whether, and When, to Cut Off Cellphone Service, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2012, at B3.
While the Communications Act may indeed prohibit BART’s speech restraint, this Com-
ment seeks to distill and analyze the purely constitutional issues surrounding the BART
restriction.
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First Amendment framework does not adequately solve the distinctive
challenges presented by the BART restriction, how might free speech
law be best adapted in the era of the Twitter revolution?
Part I summarizes the state of First Amendment law relevant to
determining the constitutionality of BART’s actions. It considers the
precedent controlling protected and unprotected Internet speech,
the doctrine of prior restraints, the tripartite framework of the public
forum doctrine, and these doctrines’ triggering of the varying levels of
judicial scrutiny.
Part II applies the Supreme Court’s First Amendment framework
to the BART restriction and concludes (1) mobile Internet access is
presumptively protected by the First Amendment and could not be
silenced in BART stations on the basis of incitement, (2) mobile In-
ternet access in BART stations qualifies as a designated public forum
triggering strict scrutiny, (3) the BART restriction on Internet access
constituted an impermissible prior restraint, also triggering strict scru-
tiny, and (4) the BART restriction was content-based and fails to pass
the strict scrutiny standard applied to a content-based restriction.
Part III sets out a normative argument that government-provided
Internet access should always qualify as a designated public forum,
and restricting these “internet access fora” should trigger strict scru-
tiny unless the targeted speech itself falls into an unprotected cate-
gory. Finally, this Comment concludes that this adaptation to the
public forum doctrine best balances the substantial benefits of In-
ternet free speech against legitimate governmental and safety
interests.
I. Legal Background: Free Speech Jurisprudence Online and
Off
In assessing the constitutionality of a state-propagated speech re-
striction, our modern First Amendment framework comprises of
often-competing sub-doctrines that consider whether the speech falls
within the ambit of the First Amendment, whether the speech oc-
curred in a public forum, and whether the restriction targeted the
speech based on the content or viewpoint of the message. In other
words, a court must ask what the speech was, where the speech oc-
curred, and how the government’s restriction targeted the speech.17
Additionally, a court considers whether the restriction was a so-called
17. See Julie A. Nice, How Equality Constitutes Liberty: The Alignment of CLS v. Martinez,
38 Hastings Const. L.Q. 631, 637-38 (2011). See generally MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON
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“prior restraint” on speech.18 The answer to each of these questions
determines the level of scrutiny a court uses to review the govern-
ment’s restriction.19
There are (at least) three levels of scrutiny a court can apply:
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and rationality review.20 If a regu-
lation is to survive strict scrutiny, it must be narrowly tailored, serve a
compelling government interest, and use the least restrictive means to
serve that interest.21 If a regulation is subject to intermediate scrutiny,
it must be “‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental in-
terest,’” be substantially related to that interest, and “‘leave open am-
ple alternative channels for communication of the information.’”22
Finally, a regulation subject to the default level of constitutional re-
view—rational basis review—must be reasonably related to a legiti-
mate government interest.23
A. Protected and Unprotected Speech
Even though the First Amendment appears to be written in con-
clusive language,24 the right to free speech is not absolute. Certain
categories of speech are presumptively protected, while other catego-
ries fall entirely outside the ambit of protection.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1984); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV 964, 994 (1978).
18. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 709–23 (1931) (holding that a prior restraint
on publication failed constitutional muster under the First Amendment). A prior restraint
is a speech restriction imposed by the government in advance of the speech’s utterance,
publication or distribution. The classic example is the government securing an injunction
against a newspaper to prevent the newspaper from ever publishing particular content. See,
e.g., id. at 732–37.
19. See analysis infra Part II.
20. See Jennifer L. Greenblatt, Putting the Government to the (Heightened, Intermediate, or
Strict) Scrutiny Test: Disparate Application Shows Not All Rights and Powers Are Created Equal, 10
FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 421, 433–36 (2009); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1273 (2007).
21. Id. at 1315–34. This most demanding level of scrutiny has been notoriously re-
ferred to as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term – Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). But see Adam Winkley, Fatal in Theory and Strict in
Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 869–71.
22. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
23. See Fallon, supra note 20, at 1273 & n.20; Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational
Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 803 (2006).
24. See U.S. CONST., AMEND. I.
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The Supreme Court was clear in Reno v. ACLU25 that speech oc-
curring online is generally presumed protected.26 On this basis, the
Court struck down a law criminalizing the transmission of indecent
material to a minor as violative of the First Amendment.27 It is less
clear to what extent the First Amendment protects an individual’s
right to access the Internet. In offline contexts, the Court has found
the right to receive information is inherent in the right to speak and
“the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amend-
ment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge.”28 In online con-
texts, the Court has at least implicitly assumed access to the Internet is
a protected expressive activity under the First Amendment. For exam-
ple, in United States v. American Library Ass’n29 (“ALA”), the Court up-
held a law requiring libraries to install Internet filtering software on
their computer terminals in exchange for funding.30 The American
Library Association challenged the funding provision, one element of
the Children’s Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”), claiming it forced
libraries to censor online adult material in violation of library patrons’
First Amendment rights. While the majority upheld the law, it based
its decision on the public forum doctrine and assumed without stating
that access to the Internet is presumptively protected under the First
Amendment.31 Lower courts have more explicitly presumed access to
the Internet constitutes protected speech. In Mainstream Loudon v.
Board of Trustees of Loudon County Library,32 for example, a district court
struck down a statute requiring libraries to implement filtering
software on their computer terminals, arguing that it abrogated li-
brary patrons’ right to access the Internet.33
25. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
26. See id. at 850–53, 868–69.
27. Id. at 849.
28. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“the Constitution protects the right to receive information and
ideas”).
29. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
30. Id. at 199.
31. See generally id.
32. 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
33. See id. at 570. While ALA appears to contradict, or even overrule, Mainstream Lou-
doun, this Comment argues the cases are distinguishable on their specific facts. Notably,
the trial court in Mainstream Loudoun made significant findings of fact regarding the library
board’s intent to designate the library as a public forum. Id. at 361–63. In ALA, the Court
had no such findings before it, and instead relied solely on its own assumption that “[a]
public library does not acquire Internet terminals in order to create a public forum.” ALA,
539 U.S. at 206. This difference is significant for public forum analysis, and a more detailed
comparison of ALA and Mainstream Loudoun is provided infra, Part I.B.
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Even if online speech is presumptively protected, there are cer-
tain circumstances where the government may still restrict speech re-
gardless of where it is spoken or whether the regulation is facially
content-based. This speech is usually characterized as “utterly without
redeeming social importance.”34 Examples of unprotected speech in-
clude incitement,35 fighting words,36 obscenity,37 child pornogra-
phy,38 defamation,39 and communicative conduct.40 The only category
relevant to the BART restriction is incitement.41
Under Brandenburg, advocacy of “imminent lawless action,” which
is “likely to incite or produce such action,” is speech unworthy of First
Amendment protection.42 In outlining this test, the Court reversed
the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader who gave a speech warning
“that there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken” for “con-
tinue[d] suppress[ion] of the white, Caucasian race.”43 The Court
found that the speech was not calculated to provoke “imminent law-
less action,” and was unlikely to actually produce such action.44 Bran-
denburg’s test is notoriously difficult to meet, and the Supreme Court
has rejected numerous cases raising the issue of incitement.45
B. The Public Forum Doctrine
Once speech is categorized as protectable under the First Amend-
ment, the second major inquiry focuses on where the speech oc-
curred. In its original and broadest formulation of the so-called public
forum doctrine, the Supreme Court held that speech occurring on
certain government property merits greater protection than speech
34. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
35. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
36. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
37. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
38. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
39. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
40. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
41. Following the August 11, 2011 protest, BART officials released a letter explaining
that prior to the protest, police amassed evidence of an “imminent threat of unlawful and
dangerous activities.” A Letter from BART to Our Customers, http://www.bart.gov/news/
articles/2011/news20110820.aspx (Aug. 20, 2011) [hereinafter BART Letter]. This lan-
guage tracks closely to the test from Brandenburg. 395 U.S. at 447 (government may pro-
hibit advocacy “inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action”). On this basis, BART argued that its disruption of cell service did
not abrogate the First Amendment. See BART Letter, supra note 41.
42. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
43. Id. at 445–48.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware, 458
U.S. 886 (1982).
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occurring elsewhere.46 In other words, “[t]he proper First Amend-
ment analysis differs depending on whether the area in question falls
in one category rather than another.”47 In its present formulation, the
public forum doctrine includes three categories or fora: the tradi-
tional public forum, the designated public forum, and the non-public
forum.48
In determining whether government property may be catego-
rized as a traditional public forum, the Court asks whether the area
was “time out of mind . . . used for purposes of assembly, communicat-
ing thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”49 As
the case law developed, the clearest examples of traditional public
fora included streets and parks,50 and later, with some limitations,
sidewalks.51 In these settings, content-based regulations are subject to
strict scrutiny, even if those regulations are viewpoint-neutral.52 If,
however, the restrictions are content-neutral and regulate only the
time, place, and manner of the speech (a “TPM” restriction), the re-
strictions must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmen-
tal interest [and] leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.”53
Despite this relatively clear formulation, the Court has added two
other potential fora where speech may occur, creating a tripartite
framework.54 The “designated” public forum emerges when “govern-
ment property that has not traditionally been regarded as a public
forum is intentionally opened up for that purpose; speech restrictions
in such a forum are subject to the same strict scrutiny as restrictions in
a traditional public forum.”55 While a state does not need to keep the
46. See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939). See generally Schneider v. New
Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
47. See Board of Airport Com’rs of City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S.
569, 572–73 (1987).
48. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez (“CLS”), 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010).
49. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
50. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
51. See U.S. v. Grace, 461 US 171, 177 (1983).
52. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding under
strict scrutiny a ban on last-minute campaigning in vicinity of polling place); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (striking down ban on residential picketing because of labor
exception).
53. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
54. See Davis S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA L. REV. 143, 160–64
(1991).
55. CLS, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010) (internal quotation marks removed); see
also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
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forum open for speech purposes forever, “as long as it does so it is
bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.”56
That is, “[r]easonable time, place and manner regulations are permis-
sible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to ef-
fectuate a compelling state interest.”57
The final category, the non-public forum, is any forum that does
not fit into the two preceding categories.58 In non-public fora the gov-
ernment has broad discretion to pass laws that are content-based, so
long as they are not viewpoint based.59 In effect, this means any non-
viewpoint-based regulation must pass the low bar of rationality
review.60
The term “limited” public forum was previously used by scholars
and the Court as a synonym for designated public forum,61 but re-
cently the Court has suggested that the limited public forum may actu-
ally be a subset of the non-public forum, and is created when the
government opens property “limited to use by certain groups or dedi-
cated solely to the discussion of certain subjects.”62 In this type of fo-
rum, “a government entity may impose restrictions on speech that are
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.”63
The Court has not directly dealt with the issue of the train station
as a public forum; however, in International Society for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. v. Lee64 (“ISKCON”) the Court found an airport was neither a
traditional nor a designated public forum.65 Airports, according to the
Court, were relatively recent inventions with the purpose of transport-
56. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. See id. A content-based restriction is one that silences a message based on its sub-
ject matter, whereas a viewpoint based restriction is one that silences a message based on
the position the speaker has taken on the subject matter.
60. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 269–73 (1988).
61. See Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited Public Forum, 33 NOVA L. REV. 299,
300–02 (2009).
62. CLS, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010). For example, in CLS, the chapter of the
Christian Legal Society at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, which
only permitted membership to non-homosexual students of faith, filed suit against the
school for barring them from student organization funding and support. Since the school
created its student organization funding program with the purpose of facilitating only cer-
tain types of speech, the Court reasoned, the program constituted a limited public forum.
Further, the school was constitutionally permitted to bar access to student groups not in
compliance with the school’s open membership policy for student groups. See id. at
2978–82.
63. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
64. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
65. See id.
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ing customers, and have neither been areas traditionally used for ex-
pressive activity, nor areas designated by the government for the
purpose of expressive activity.66 On this basis, the Court upheld a reg-
ulation prohibiting the distribution of handbills in the airport.67
The applicability of the public forum doctrine to the Internet is
the subject of continued debate.68 In ALA, for example, the Court
held a library had not created a designated public forum by installing
computer terminals and allowing access to the Internet.69 The Court
reasoned that “[a] public library does not acquire Internet terminals
in order to create a public forum for Web publishers to express them-
selves,” but instead “to facilitate research, learning, and recreational
pursuits by furnishing materials of requisite and appropriate qual-
ity.”70 On the other hand, in Mainstream Loudon, a lower court struck
down a library regulation blocking certain Internet sites based on
their content.71 It concluded the library board “intended to designate
the Loudoun County libraries as public fora” for numerous purposes,
“including the receipt and communication of information through
the Internet.”72
While ALA may appear to vitiate the district court’s reasoning in
Mainstream Loudon, the cases are distinguishable on their facts. Both
the Supreme Court and district court focused their public forum in-
quiries on the question of government intent. In ALA, the plurality
concluded the libraries had not intended to create a forum for all
expressive online activities. In order to create such a forum, the Court
explained, “the government must make an affirmative choice to open
up its property for use as a public forum.”73 Conversely, in Mainstream
Loudon the district court had an extensive record of facts indicating
the library board’s intent to open a broad forum for a wide variety of
speech activities.74 For these reasons it is not entirely clear how the
66. See id. at 680–81.
67. See id.
68. See Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the Elec-
tronic Environment, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 158–59 (1998). See generally Steven G. Gey,
Reopening the Public Forum-From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535 (1998); Stacy D.
Schesser, A New Domain for Public Speech: Opening Public Spaces Online, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1791
(2006).
69. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n (“ALA”), 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003).
70. Id.
71. 24 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
72. Id. at 562–63.
73. ALA, 539 U.S. at 206.
74. See infra note 125 and accompanying text detailing the specific facts on which the
Mainstream Loudoun court relied.
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Supreme Court might rule on a finding of facts analogous to Main-
stream Loudon, but the key factual difference between the cases does
allow future courts to reconcile what might otherwise seem to be in-
consistent precedent.
At the least, this pair of cases highlights the importance of gov-
ernment intent in determining whether particular government prop-
erty constitutes a designated public forum.75 As the government
continues to open Internet access terminals to the public, courts are
likely to evaluate the government’s stated intent or purpose in provid-
ing gateways to the web.
C. The Doctrine Against Prior Restraints
Knitted within the First Amendment’s doctrinal quilt is the gen-
eral disapproval of speech restrictions enforced in advance of publica-
tion, dissemination or reception.76 While the doctrine lacks some
clarity, the general formulation first adopted by the Supreme Court in
Near v. Minnesota77 distinguished between restrictions prohibiting
speech prior to publication and regulations that impose ex post sanc-
tions.78 In Near the Court held invalid a state court’s injunction
prohibiting all future publications of a potentially defamatory newspa-
per.79 Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, explained the
“liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the Fed-
eral Constitution, has meant . . . immunity from previous restraints or
censorship.”80
Prior restraints take many forms.81 The most common present-
day prior restraints are injunctions and administrative licensing
75. See generally Felix Wu, Note, United States v. American Library Ass’n: The Children’s
Internet Protection Act, Library Filtering, and Institutional Roles, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555,
570–75 (2004) (explaining and disagreeing with the role government intent plays in forum
analysis).
76. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 412–17
(1983).
77. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
78. Id. at 709–23.
79. Id. at 722–23.
80. Id. at 716.
81. Prior restraints can be traced back to “administrative preclearances” in England.
See Richard Favata, Filling the Void in First Amendment Jurisprudence: Is There A Solution for
Replacing the Impotent System of Prior Restraints?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 169, 169–70 (2003).
This history was influential to the Court’s reasoning in Near. Speaking for the majority,
Chief Justice Hughes explained:
The question is whether a statute authorizing such proceedings in restraint of
publication is consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as histori-
cally conceived and guaranteed. In determining the extent of the constitutional
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schemes.82 Since Near, the Court has reaffirmed that “[a]ny system of
prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy pre-
sumption against its constitutional validity.”83 As a result, the State
“carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of
such a restraint.”84 Despite this strong presumption against prior re-
straints, there exists a litany of exceptions to the doctrine. For exam-
ple, narrowly tailored prior restraints are sometimes permissible when
the threatened speech is considered obscene,85 when the speech
might affect the fairness of a criminal trial,86 or when the speech
poses a substantial risk to national security.87 In Near, the Supreme
Court also noted “the security of the community life may be protected
against incitements of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly
government.”88
What has generally emerged from these and subsequent opinions
is a framework that permits prior restraints when it is clear at the out-
set the restricted speech would constitute incitement.89 Like other
speech restrictions, prior restraints that take the form of licensing re-
strictions are generally permissible if the restrictions regulate the
protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief
purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication. The
struggle in England, directed against the legislative power of the licenser, resulted
in renunciation of the censorship of the press. The liberty deemed to be estab-
lished was thus described by Blackstone: “The liberty of the press is indeed essen-
tial to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when
published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he
pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but
if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the conse-
quence of his own temerity.”
Near, 283 U.S. at 713–14 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *151–52).
82. See Favata, supra note 81, at 170; Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability,
and the Constitutionalism of Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 298–99 (1999).
83. Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
84. Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); see also N.Y. Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
85. See Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47–50 (1961); Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 440 (1957).
86. See Neb. Press Ass’n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
87. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (“No one would question but that
a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication
of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”). See generally N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at passim (discussing and rejecting the applicability of
the national security exception); Robert F. Flinn, The National Security Exception to the Doc-
trine of Prior Restraint, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 214, 218–21 (1971).
88. Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
89. See, e.g., Silverman, supra note 13.
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time, place or manner of the speech.90 Pre-publication licensing re-
strictions based on a message’s content, however, are presumptively
unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny.91 Thus, while incite-
ment analysis and time, place and manner analysis are often formu-
lated as separate free speech doctrines, the doctrine of prior restraints
snugly abuts both concepts.
D. Types of Restrictions and Judicial Scrutiny
Having determined that speech has fallen within a particular fo-
rum or was subject to a prior restraint, the court will then look to the
type of speech targeted by the restriction in order to decide the
proper judicial scrutiny. As mentioned above, in traditional or limited
public fora, restrictions that are content neutral, or proper time,
place, and manner restrictions, are subject to intermediate scrutiny.92
Regulations that are content or viewpoint based, however, are subject
to strict scrutiny.93 In a non-public forum, only viewpoint based re-
strictions receive heightened judicial scrutiny—all other restrictions
are usually analyzed under rational basis review.94
Content-based restrictions are generally subject to a higher level
of scrutiny because “Government action that stifles speech on account
of its message or that requires the utterance of a particular message
favored by the Government, contravenes [the free speech] right.”95
The “principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
[agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys.”96 View-
90. Though licensing restrictions qualify as prior restraints on speech, when such re-
strictions are not content-based the Supreme Court has often characterized these restric-
tions as permissible time, place and manner restrictions without engaging in a prior
restraints analysis. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795 n.5 (1989)
(rejecting dissent’s contention that noise regulation constituted a prior restraint). See gener-
ally United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (upholding regulation prohibit-
ing the burning of draft cards without considering prior restraint doctrine); Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966) (upholding prohibition on speech activities around
curtilage of a jail without considering prior restraint doctrine).
91. See Marin Scordato, Distinction Without A Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of
Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989).
92. See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
93. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding
under strict scrutiny ban on last-minute campaigning in vicinity of polling place); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980) (striking down ban on residential picketing because of
labor exception).
94. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
95. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
96. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988).
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point based restrictions are those where the government has sought to
restrict speech not just because of the message’s content, but because
of the specific position the message takes on a particular issue.97
Unlike content and viewpoint based regulations, TPM restric-
tions, which are enacted not because of agreement or disagreement
with the content of the message, are aimed at curtailing secondary
effects of speech by altering the time, place, or manner in which indi-
viduals may engage in such speech. For example, in City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc.,98 the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that
kept adult movie theaters out of residential neighborhoods.99 The ma-
jority determined Renton had not enacted its ordinance in order to
censor particular content or subject matter, instead to “prevent crime,
protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, and generally
‘protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city’s] neighborhoods,
commercial districts, and the quality of urban life.’”100 Because Ren-
ton sought to control these secondary effects, and “allow[ed] for rea-
sonable alternative avenues of communication,” the ordinance was
constitutional.101
In applying these tests to Internet-related restrictions, the Court
found a regulation criminalizing the transmission of indecent mate-
rial to minors to be content-based.102 Similarly, a regulation requiring
libraries to filter pornographic content in exchange for funds was also
content-based.103 The Court has not addressed the specific issue of
whether a temporary shutdown of Internet access would be a proper
TPM restriction. Presumably such a restriction would be valid if it
targeted only secondary effects caused by the speech and allowed rea-
sonable alternative channels of communication.
II. Analyzing the BART Restriction
When the foregoing doctrines are applied to the BART restric-
tion, the restriction fails to meet the requisite First Amendment
thresholds. As argued more fully below, the restriction infringed upon
a protected class of speech: a passenger’s right to receive ideas via
97. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 535 (2001).
98. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
99. Id. at 48–49.
100. Id. at 48. The Court explained “[i]t is th[e] secondary effect which these zoning
ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of ‘offensive’ speech.” Id. at 49.
101. Id. at 50.
102. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871
(1997).
103. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n (ALA), 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003).
Summer 2012] BART’S SPEECH RESTRICTION 209
access to the Internet. This speech was not incitement because there
was no evidence of imminent lawless activity. The restriction was im-
plemented within a designated public forum—the forum defined not
by the geographic bound of the trains or stations, but more narrowly
by the radio towers and wireless devices over which information is
transferred. The restriction was also an impermissible prior restraint.
The BART restriction was content-based since it was implemented be-
cause of disagreement with a specific message. As a content-based
prior restraint in a designated public forum, the BART restriction is
subject to strict scrutiny and fails to pass this high standard.
The very limited scholarship analyzing the BART restriction has
sometimes come to a different conclusion. Notably, Professor Eugene
Volokh believes the restriction to be constitutional because it was im-
posed on government property that was a non-public forum.104 In the
following analysis, this Comment will specifically address Volokh’s ar-
gument and suggest why the BART restriction fails constitutional mus-
ter. The disagreement, however, is little more than a testament to the
muddled state of the law and, as argued in Part III, highlights the
need for greater development and clarification among First Amend-
ment doctrines.
A. Internet Access Constitutes Protected Speech
While it is clear from Reno that online speech is presumptively
within the ambit of First Amendment protection, extending such a
presumption to Internet access itself is also consistent with Supreme
Court precedent.105 Access to speech amounts to protected First
Amendment activity. The right to receive information is inherent in
the right to speak, and the Court has explained “the State may not,
consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spec-
trum of available knowledge.”106 It follows that BART passengers have
a First Amendment right to access information on the Internet. The
Court in ALA implicitly assumed as much by treating patrons’ rights to
access the Internet, including pornographic materials, as protected
speech.107 Similarly, lower courts have followed suit in presuming ac-
104. Volokh, supra note 13.
105. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 852–53.
106. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
107. See ALA, 539 U.S. at 215 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority’s
disposition but noting the statute may be unconstitutional “if it is shown that an adult
user’s election to view constitutionally protected Internet material is burdened”).
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cess to the Internet constitutes protected speech.108 For these reasons
the right to access the Internet in BART stations is presumptively pro-
tected under the First Amendment.
B. Internet Access in BART Stations Was Not Incitement
The next step of the inquiry asks whether, despite this general
presumption of protection, the specific speech at issue was “utterly
without redeeming social importance” such that it falls into a category
of unprotected speech.109 The only category of unprotected speech at
issue here is incitement, as BART asserted the wireless network disrup-
tion was aimed at ensuring the safety of its customers.110 However,
“there is skepticism about the amount of danger, if any, that would
have been posed by cell phone use without any restrictions in
place.”111 BART argues that the intelligence it received about the
planned protest, considered in context with a protest that occurred a
month earlier in which a protestor crawled on top of a train, com-
bined to “constitute a serious and imminent threat to the safety of
BART passengers.”112 Yet this statement only suggests that the intelli-
gence gathered by BART might be considered incitement. While this
earlier speech may or may not have passed the Brandenburg test, there
is no way BART could have known in advance that cutting web access
would prevent advocacy of lawlessness from occurring via cell phones
on the day of the scheduled protest. This conclusion demonstrates
why prior restraints are presumptively invalid limits on speech.113 It
would be impossible for BART, or a jurist of any caliber, to draw the
legal conclusion that certain speech constitutes incitement before that
108. See, e.g., Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Lib., 24 F. Supp.
2d 552, 570 (E.D. Va. 1998).
109. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
110. See BART Letter, supra note 41. BART has made no claim the speech curtailed by
the BART restriction constituted any other type of unprotected speech (including fighting
words, obscenity, child pornography, defamation, or communicative conduct). See id. At
any rate, none of these categories are particularly relevant to the present inquiry, since it is
generally unlikely these unprotected types of speech were being transmitted or received
over BART’s mobile Internet system at the time of the restriction. For case law generally
outlining these unprotected categories of speech see generally supra notes 35–40. Even if
these other types of speech were being communicated or received over the Internet by
BART patrons, the BART restriction would likely fail for overbreadth. See generally R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 483 (1989).
111. See Silverman, supra note 13.
112. BART Letter, supra note 41.
113. See discussion on prior restraints infra Part II.D.
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speech is ever uttered.114 Even if the indicators suggested each and
every patron in BART stations and trains was going to advocate lawless
activity, and this advocacy was actually likely to incite such activity, the
mere threat of such speech would not be enough to suppress the
speech on a theory of incitement. In the language of justiciability, the
matter would not be ripe for review. BART had general and amor-
phous claims of threats to passenger safety, and that alone cannot per-
mit a speech restriction under Brandenburg.
C. Internet Access in BART Stations as Designated Public Fora
There is no doubt BART stations and trains, and the technology
and equipment used to provide Internet access in those stations and
trains, constitute government-owned property. Thus access to the In-
ternet in BART stations and trains falls within one of three fora. The
nascence of the technology also dictates that Internet access, either
generally or in BART stations and trains, has not been “time out of
mind . . . used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions.”115
Some scholars and commentators have suggested that since
BART stations themselves do not fit into the category of traditional
public fora, they are non-public fora.116 Professor Volokh, for exam-
ple, relies on the ISKCON decision for just such a proposition.117 But
this reasoning is errant in two ways: First, it fails to examine whether
BART stations might fall into the intermediate category of designated
public fora; and second, it mischaracterizes the “geographic” area to
be analyzed. In conducting a forum analysis on the BART facts, confu-
sion abounds as to what speech was actually restricted. Was it a protes-
tor’s right to speak or assemble on the BART platform, or a patron’s
right to access the Internet on a platform and train? Certainly both
were subject to certain restrictions. Professor Volokh is right to say
that under ISKCON, protestors had no constitutional right to protest
within BART stations themselves. But this is distinct from a patron’s
right to access the Internet within a station or train, especially when
the transit agency took affirmative steps to offer this access. This can
be thought of as BART’s “Internet access forum.” The forum is bound
114. See Silverman, supra note 13.
115. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
116. See Volokh, supra note 13; Silverman, supra note 13; Technology Aids Free Speech - And
Its Suppression, Talk of the Nation, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.npr.org/
2011/08/19/139790022/technology-aids-free-speech (with guests Eugene Volokh and Ken
Paulson).
117. See Volokh, supra note 13.
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in two ways. First geographically, to the BART trains and stations
where the signal from BART’s towers extend and second, technologi-
cally, to the radio towers, signals, and wireless handheld devices that
actually transmit and render bits of information into decipherable
user interfaces.
Having established the appropriate physical bounds of the forum
in question, the next inquiry focuses on the intent of the government
actor in opening such a forum. As discussed earlier, the government’s
intent in opening a forum is largely dispositive in determining the
scope of that forum. Here, BART took the affirmative steps to wire
their trains and stations to provide Internet access to passengers.118
Most publicly available evidence suggests BART installed this technol-
ogy with the purpose of providing its customers convenient and un-
restricted access to the Internet.119 While the cell towers support
access to mobile phones as well as mobile Internet, Chuck Rae,
BART’s manager of telecommunications revenue, was reported in
2005 as stating he expected most riders would use their wireless de-
vices to read and send e-mail or browse the Internet.120 According to
Mr. Rae, the goal was to “completely wire 100 percent of the under-
ground so a passenger (on a wireless device) wouldn’t know if they
were above ground or underground.”121
BART’s purpose in opening this forum is distinguishable from
Professor Volokh’s analogy to university classrooms where Internet ac-
cess is restricted to keep students focused.122 At a university, Internet
access within classrooms is offered as a pedagogical tool. Perhaps the
ability to access the Internet within a classroom is simply a technologi-
cal necessity—a spillover from offering Internet access in other parts
of campus. It is hard to believe that a university would offer access to
the Internet for general use within a classroom if it also believed this
type of broad access to the Internet for non-pedagogical purposes
would distract and detract from learning. Thus the distinguishing
characteristic between a university classroom and a BART station is
the purpose for which the forum was opened in the first place.
BART offered Internet access to customers specifically for broad
use within their stations and trains. BART had no expectation that
118. See Michael Cabanatuan, Underground, But Not Unconnected—BART Offers Wireless
Service to Riders, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 19, 2005), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f
=/c/a/2005/11/19/MNGF2FR6C11.DTL.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Volokh, supra note 13.
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access to the Internet would be used only to further BART’s purpose
as an agency or institution.123 There was also no requirement for
BART to open access to the Internet to its customers. All of this indi-
cates that BART “intentionally” opened a public forum “not tradition-
ally regarded as a public forum” for the purpose of offering unfiltered
wireless access to its customers.124 This formulation is consistent with
the designated public forum as described in ALA and Mainstream
Loudon. While the Supreme Court in the former, and the district court
in the latter, came to different conclusions on whether Internet access
within a library constituted a designated public forum, the cases are
legally consistent because both agree the touchstone of these cases is
the intent of the state actor. The district court in Mainstream Loudon
concluded from the record that the library’s intent in offering un-
restricted Internet access to its patrons was to open a forum for a wide
variety of speech activities.125 In a similar way, all publicly available
information indicates BART’s intent in providing equally unrestricted
access to the Internet. BART’s Internet access forum is a designated
public forum consistent with Perry, ISKCON, ALA, Mainstream Loudon
and CLS.
D. The BART Restriction Was an Impermissible Prior Restraint
The BART restriction also fails to pass constitutional muster on
the grounds that the speech restriction was an impermissible prior
restraint. Since most modern-day prior restraints take the form of li-
censing restrictions or judicial injunctions, there is little precedent re-
garding prior restraints limiting Internet access, and what little there
is focuses almost exclusively on Internet filtering restrictions.126 The
doctrine remains undeveloped where the restriction in question was a
123. While one must assume BART’s primary goal was to increase ridership and reve-
nue by offering convenient wireless access, this alone does not negate the agency’s inten-
tion to accomplish this goal by offering unbound Internet access.
124. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez (CLS), 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010).
125. The court relied specifically on a resolution adopted by the Library Board a few
years earlier, noting:
[The] defendant declared that its “primary objective . . . [is] that the people have
access to all avenues of ideas.” Furthermore, the same resolution states that the
public interest requires “offering the widest possible diversity of views and expres-
sions” in many different media, not diminishing the library collection simply be-
cause “minors might have access to materials with controversial content,” not
excluding any materials because of the nature of the information or views within,
and not censoring ideas.
Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563 (citations omitted).
126. See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, How (Not) to Censor: Procedural First Amendment Values
and Internet Censorship Worldwide, 42 GEO. J. INTL. L. 1123, 1142–57 (2011) (relying on the
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complete (albeit temporary) censor on access to a particular medium
of communication. This is almost certainly because such restrictions
remained entirely unprecedented until the BART restriction.127
Despite the lack of precedent, it is clear BART’s total censorship
restriction would fare poorly under Near.128 The restriction sought to
suppress speech prior to publication (or, in this case, dissemination
and reception). The restriction was not a traditional licensing scheme,
so the doctrine’s permission of content-neutral or time, place and
manner licensing restrictions do not permit BART’s swift and absolute
cell phone shutdown. The strongest argument in favor of the BART
restriction characterizes the restricted speech as incitement, yet there
was no way for BART to know whether speech occurring over its cell
phone network would advocate “imminent lawless action,” and even if
it did, whether such speech was “likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion.”129 Whether speech constitutes incitement and merits no First
Amendment protection is a legal conclusion that could only be drawn
post-utterance. The BART example is markedly different from the sit-
uation where the government seeks an injunction to bar a newspaper
from publishing a piece that may threaten national security.130 In that
scenario, a judge may evaluate the merits of the government’s restric-
tion by reviewing the speech before it is ever disseminated.
The BART restriction thus poses a unique question: whether
speech may be suspended consistent with the doctrine of prior re-
straints on the possibility such speech might constitute incitement.131
The rationale behind Near suggests it cannot. The Court rejected the
notion that a publisher could, consistent with the First Amendment,
be enjoined from future publication of potentially defamatory mate-
rial,132 because such a restriction constitutes “the essence of censor-
ship.”133 In the same way, BART was not permitted to effect a total cell
prior restraints doctrine to propose a framework of procedural safeguards for online
speech).
127. See Gene Policinski, BART Cell Shutdown a Landmark in Cyber-assembly, FIRST AMEND-
MENT CENTER (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/bart-cell-shutdown-
a-landmark-in-cyber-assembly/.
128. See Silverman, supra note 13.
129. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (1969).
130. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
131. Recalling that “falsely shout[ing] ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theater” constitutes the clas-
sic example of unprotected speech, Policinski appropriately frames the question in the
BART case: “Does a report that someone, sometime might falsely shout ‘Fire!’ justify taping
over the mouths of all of the theatergoers as they enter . . . if only in that place, on that
night, and only during that play?” Policinski, supra note 127.
132. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713–16 (1931).
133. Id. at 713.
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phone blackout on the mere suspicion incitement might occur over
their network. Thus, the BART restriction constituted a pure and di-
rect prior restraint. Since “[a]ny system of prior restraints . . . bear[s]
a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity,” the BART re-
striction is undoubtedly subject to strict scrutiny.134
E. The BART Restriction was Content-Based and Fails Strict
Scrutiny
The BART restriction was based on the content of the message it
was trying to suppress. Professor Volokh agrees with this point,
explaining:
The restriction is facially content-neutral, but the justification is re-
lated to the content of the speech that the government is worried
about — the government isn’t just trying to prevent physical dis-
ruption caused by the noncommunicative effects of cell phones . . .
but physical disruption caused by what people communicate to
each other using cell phones.135
It is clear from BART’s letter it was not targeting mobile Internet ac-
cess generally, but communication among protestors specifically.136
This satisfies the “principal inquiry in determining content neutral-
ity,” which is “whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it
conveys.”137
The BART restriction also fails under the Renton standard for a
proper TPM restriction. BART might argue its restriction was based
not on the content of the message, but the secondary effects of law-
lessness caused by the message. Even if this were the case, the speech
restriction was not tailored in a way that left open ample alternative
methods of communication. When Internet access is curtailed, there
is no reasonable alternative means by which to disseminate and re-
ceive information. If BART had filtered access to only certain social
networking sites, perhaps the outcome would be different. A patron
who cannot check Facebook might be able to Tweet. Or a passenger
who temporarily cannot access the New York Times might check Huf-
fington Post. But complete censorship of Internet access is inconsistent
with the Court’s formulation of a proper TPM restriction as outlined
in Renton.
134. Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
135. See Volokh, supra note 13.
136. See BART Letter, supra note 41.
137. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
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Because BART implemented a content-based prior restraint in a
designated public forum, the restriction must meet strict scrutiny: it
must be narrowly tailored, serve a compelling government interest,
and the regulation must be the least restrictive means to serve that
interest.138 BART’s alleged purpose—safety—is usually considered a
significant state interest.139 But BART’s means of achieving that goal is
not narrowly tailored. Just as the Reno Court struck down the law be-
cause other more tailored alternatives were available, here too BART
could have ensured safety by adding more police officers, being more
vigilant about protest policies, or never offering Internet access in its
stations at the outset. Similarly, the restriction was not the least restric-
tive means for serving BART’s interest. It could have attempted to fil-
ter access to websites it presumed would fuel unsafe protest.140
Instead, it silenced every type of speech facilitated by Internet access.
As such, the restraint serves as the very model of an overbroad limit.
While passenger safety is a particularly compelling interest, BART had
a number of alternative methods available to ensure the security of its
patrons. Instead, it curbed First Amendment activities with a shotgun
approach that flunks an examination under strict scrutiny.
III. Policy Considerations: Protecting Internet Access Under
an Internet Access Forum Doctrine
In the above analysis this Comment has argued the forum at issue
in the BART case is an “Internet access forum,” a designated public
forum defined by the geographic limitations of the Internet signal
and the technological limitations of the devices over which data is sent
and received. This concept should be broadly adopted as a special
version of the designated public forum. When government opens up
public access to the Internet intended for broad public use, the In-
ternet access forum must remain open, and any attempt by state ac-
tors to regulate it must be reviewed with strict judicial scrutiny.
Because the intent of state actors tends to set the scope of a desig-
nated public forum, and can lead to different conclusions on similar
facts, the Internet access forum should be analyzed with a strong pre-
sumption of unrestricted access. Only when the state actor has clearly
138. See Fallon, supra note 20.
139. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (identifying safety as a com-
pelling state interest in an Establishment Clause case).
140. To be clear, this type of filtering restriction would raise a catalogue of its own First
Amendment concerns. See generally Nunziato, supra note 126, at 1142–57. The example
serves only to demonstrate the extent of the BART restriction’s overbreadth.
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and affirmatively proved its intention to offer Internet access in a re-
stricted or filtered manner should an Internet access forum be limited
in scope. Such a limitation or filter would also need to comply with
other First Amendment doctrine.
There are at least three reasons why courts should always afford
Internet access fora the same protection as designated public fora:
First, the Internet epitomizes free speech principles in a way no other
medium of communication can; second, access to the Internet is a
human right; and third, an Internet access forum doctrine is consis-
tent with precedent and resolves tension by clarifying the law.
A. The Internet as Manifest Free Speech
There are many rationales for free speech under the First
Amendment, including the insurance of self-governance, the pursuit
of truth, the advancement of autonomy, and the promotion of toler-
ance.141 On balance, the utility of our First Amendment jurisprudence
recognizes “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market.”142 The Internet fur-
thers these principles in ways the Framers could not have imagined.
In the first major free speech test for the Internet, the Supreme
Court immediately recognized the inimitable nature of the medium,
comparing it “to both a vast library including millions of readily availa-
ble and indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and
services.”143 Indeed, it is “no exaggeration to conclude that the con-
tent on the Internet is as diverse as human thought.”144 With this di-
versity, the Internet promotes tolerance, not just among different
people, but also among different ideas. These ideas are tested against
one another, each thought trying “to get itself accepted in the compe-
tition of the market.”145
141. Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1223–26 (1983). Compare J.S. MILL, ON
LIBERTY 19–67 (1965) (detailing a marketplace rationale for free speech), with Baker, supra
note 17, at 964–65 (rejecting Mill’s marketplace principles with a free speech theory
founded on individual liberty).
142. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
143. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
144. Id. at 852.
145. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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The very architecture of the Internet promotes free speech prin-
ciples. A prime example is the anonymity each Internet user main-
tains while surfing under the guise of an IP address. A user can
promote heretical viewpoints absent fear of individual retribution.
While this anonymous architecture opens the door for plenty of un-
protected speech, courts have been reluctant to allow plaintiffs to un-
mask anonymous speakers.146 Along with anonymity, the robust and
decentralized architecture of the Internet makes it generally less
prone to speech suppression. As Internet innovator John Gilmore suc-
cinctly stated, “[t]he Net interprets censorship as damage and routes
around it.”147 Both the anonymous and naturally open nature of the
web encourage self-governance, autonomy, and the pursuit of truth by
establishing a safe haven for the consideration of minority ideas. This
was particularly evident during the Arab Spring revolutions over the
past two years. Where once a government could bury reports of police
brutality and state oppression, social media encouraged the memetic
spreading of such reports.148 Under the shield of anonymity inherent
in the architecture of the Internet, social media enabled protesters to
“organiz[e] the protests and . . . disseminat[e] information about
them, including publicizing protesters’ demands internationally.”149
It is perhaps cliche´ to say the Internet promotes free speech val-
ues more than any previously known technology, but the gravity of
this proposition cannot be understated. The Internet is manifest free
speech. It is the inevitable result of the open and unrestricted sharing
of ideas. The concept of the Internet access forum stands for this for-
mulation by maintaining unfettered access under all but exceptional
circumstances.
146. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460–61 (Del. 2005) (requiring plaintiff in
defamation action to make a prima facie showing of evidence sufficient to overcome a sum-
mary judgment standard before court would compel disclosure of online speaker’s
identity).
147. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, TIME, Dec. 6, 1993, available at http:/
/www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,979768,00.html; see also Lawrence Lessig,
The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507–11 (1999)
(identifying the architecture or “code” of the Internet as a “modality of regulation”).
148. It was the power of social media in particular that fanned the flames of revolution
in Tunisia, Egypt, Lybia and now Syria. See Twitter, Facebook and YouTube’s Role in Arab Spring
(Middle East uprisings), Social Capital Blog (May 23, 2012), http://socialcapital.wordpress.
com/2011/01/26/twitter-facebook-and-youtubes-role-in-tunisia-uprising/.
149. Ekaterina Stepanova, The Role of Information Communication Technologies in the “Arab
Spring,” PONARS EURASIA POLICY MEMO NO. 159 at 1, 2 (May 2011), available at http://
www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm_159.pdf.
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B. Internet Access as a Fundamental Human Right
Even before Egypt shut off Internet access to its citizens, scholars
and organizations extolled Internet access as a human right in and of
itself.150 Pointing to corollary benefits such as access to economic op-
portunity, education, disaster relief, and global citizenship and de-
mocracy, these human right proponents continue to seek to bring the
Internet to the nearly 5 billion currently unconnected people.151
While there remains some debate over whether Internet access is wor-
thy of the lofty status of “human right,”152 countries including
France,153 Estonia,154 Finland,155 Greece156 and Spain157 have already
affirmed a right to access the Internet. Consistent with this movement,
last year the United Nations Human Rights Counsel (“UNHRC”) de-
clared Internet access to be a fundamental human right.158 The
UNHRC emphasized the “unique and transformative nature of the In-
ternet not only to enable individuals to exercise their right to freedom
150. See, e.g., A HUMAN RIGHT, http://www.ahumanright.org (last visited Aug. 28,
2012); Andrew Moshirnia, The Online Odyssey: Internet Use in the Age of HADOPI’s Scylla and
Holder’s Charybdis, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Oct. 27, 2009, 3:10 PM), http://www.cit
medialaw.org/blog/2009/online-odyssey-Internet-use-age-hadopis-scylla-and-holders-cha-
rybdis. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY (Rikke Frank Jor-
gensen ed., 2006).
151. See, e.g., A HUMAN RIGHT, supra note 150. For example, A Human Right launched
a “Buy This Satellite” campaign, soliciting donations to purchase an unused communica-
tions satellite and position it above Africa to provide Internet access. See Jim Fields, Q&A:
As Egypt Shuts Down the Internet, One Group Wants Online Access for All, TIME (Jan. 31, 2011),
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2045428,00.html.
152. See Vinton G. Cerf, Op-Ed, Internet Access is Not a Human Right, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5,
2012, at A25.
153. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC,
Jun. 10, 2009, J.O. 308 (Fr.) (in which France’s Constitutional Council struck down a large
portion of an antipiracy law on the grounds it infringed a French citizen’s right to access
the Internet).
154. Colin Woodward, Estonia, where being wired is a human right, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR (Jul. 1, 2003), http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0701/p07s01-woeu.html.
155. Don Reisinger, Finland makes 1Mb broadband access a legal right, CNET NEWS (Oct.
14, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17939_109-10374831-2.html.
156. See 2001 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 5A (Greece).
157. Sarah Morris, Spain govt to guarantee legal right to broadband, REUTERS (Nov. 17,
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/17/spain-telecoms-idUSLH6155432009
1117.
158. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, U.N. H.R.C., 17th Sess., May 30 – June
17, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011); David Kravets, U.N. Report Declares
Internet Access a Human Right, WIRED.COM (June. 3, 2011), http://www.wired.com/threat
level/2011/06/internet-a-human-right/; Mathew Ingram, Is Internet Access a Fundamental
Human Right?, GIGAOM (Jan 5, 2012), http://gigaom.com/2012/01/05/is-internet-access-
a-fundamental-human-right/.
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of opinion and expression, but also a range of other human rights,
and to promote the progress of society as a whole.”159
Despite these strong positive statements in favor of a free and
open Internet, the fact that the Internet was developed and invented
here,160 and that the most speech-protective case law emerged
here,161 the United States sadly lags behind the rest of the world.162
The United States, as a leader in both technology and free speech
doctrine must align its law with other industrialized nations and into
full compliance with the UNHRC declaration. Efforts at this type of
reform may take many forms, but a sensible place to start is in strictly
limiting the government’s ability to shut off mobile Internet access.
The Internet access forum proposed by this Comment accomplishes
this goal and represents a strong step in the right direction.
C. Promoting Judicial Clarity and Economy
While the idea of an Internet access forum would support general
First Amendment policy considerations, and more specifically would
promote Internet access as a fundamental right, the doctrine would
also cast light on some particularly murky First Amendment rules. Ap-
plication of the forum would require a government regulation to
meet the strict scrutiny standard unless the speech restricted is, with-
out any doubt, unprotected. First, such a doctrine is desirable specifi-
cally because of its ease of adoption. It does not advance First
Amendment jurisprudence any further than it has already progressed.
Rather, it simply clarifies the application of the designated public fo-
rum to Internet access restrictions. This methodology also leaves the
government enough leeway to curtail access in the most dire of
circumstances.163
159. Id. at 1.
160. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 147.
161. Freedom of Expression – ACLU Position Paper, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan.
2, 1997), http://www.aclu.org/free-speech/freedom-expression-aclu-position-paper (argu-
ing that “ours is the most speech-protective country in the world”).
162. While the United States has implemented a program to ensure broadband access
for a broad swath of society, it has stopped short of declaring Internet access a basic human
right. Compare Leslie Meredith, U.S. Considers ‘Internet Access for All’, TECHNEWSDAILY (Jan.
26, 2010), http://www.technewsdaily.com/47-us-considers-internet-access-for-all-100128.
html, with supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text.
163. For example, a government actor may restrict speech if it is previously known the
speech in question falls outside the ambit of First Amendment protection (if, for example,
it is judicially determined the speech is incitement, obscenity, or any of the other unpro-
tected forms of speech). These limitations are, of course, subject to the doctrine of prior
restraints. But as both Near and New York Times identified, the general proviso against pre-
publication restrictions may yield in circumstances threatening national security. See supra
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The need for greater clarity in First Amendment law, especially in
the law’s interaction with new technologies, tends to be a point of
scholarly consensus.164 In search of judicial clarity, applying public fo-
rum principles to the Internet is hardly novel. Even before ALA, Main-
stream Loudoun, or Reno, early commentators, including David
Goldstone, identified the deficiencies in free speech protection online
and proffered public forum principles as a potential solution.165 But
Goldstone is quick to highlight the significant drawbacks in applying
the tripartite framework to a burgeoning information superhigh-
way.166 Attempting to do so in three possible scenarios, the “analysis of
[the] simple hypothetical cases became quite complicated.”167 The
proposed solution, then, was a more nuanced approach to the doc-
trine’s application in online contexts.168
With the benefit of hindsight, it is easier for us to identify where
and how public forum doctrine might be applied to further speech
rights vis a vis access to the Internet. Mainstream Loudoun provides a
model scenario for when government owned access terminals consti-
tute a designated public forum. Yet ALA’s opposite conclusion on sim-
ilar facts emphasizes the doctrine’s murkiness. The most significant
difference in these cases regarded the intent of the state actor in
opening the forum.169 The Internet access forum heralded by this
Comment seeks to purify the government intent standard by creating
an initial presumption of absolute openness. When a state actor pro-
vides access to the Internet, the burden must be on the government to
prove its initial intent to limit the Internet. Further, any proven intent
to restrict access to certain types of speech must pass the test of other
First Amendment doctrines. Finally, once a forum is opened, it must
text accompanying notes 87–88. State Senator Padilla’s proposed legislation seems to have
these exceptions in mind by requiring the government actor to obtain a court order before
it could shut down access. See supra text accompanying note 14.
164. E.g., David S. Ardia, Government Speech and Online Forums: First Amendment Limita-
tions on Moderating Public Discourse on Government Websites, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1981, 1982
(2010); see also, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 76, at 420 (describing the prior restraint doctrine as
“a formulation whose current contribution to the interpretation of the First Amendment is
chiefly confusion”); Rohr, supra note 61, at 303–26 (detailing the ongoing confusion sur-
rounding the limited public forum doctrine).
165. David J. Goldstone, The Public Forum Doctrine in the Age of the Information Superhigh-
way, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 349–402 (1995) (proposing a nuanced application of the public
forum doctrine to the “information superhighway”).
166. See id at 402.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See supra Part I.B.
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remain open until the state makes an affirmative, non-arbitrary choice
to close the forum.
The clarification the Internet access forum provides would also
preempt potential speech-restrictive laws. For example, it would limit
“kill-switch” legislation by ensuring the President could cut off In-
ternet access only for the most compelling reasons and in the most
narrowly tailored manner. Future legislation, therefore, could not
grant the executive unnecessarily broad power to curtail unpopular
speech, or utilize a kill-switch in less than calamitous situations. By
synthesizing and expanding on ALA and Mainstream Loudoun, the In-
ternet access forum clarifies and reinforces existing free speech prece-
dent in a way that is easily and widely applicable. It places a high
burden on government actors who offer access to the Internet. The
result is jurisprudence that is able to work within technological reali-
ties, built to shield speech from the flighty whims of power.
Conclusion
When BART took the affirmative steps to offer its passengers In-
ternet access on its stations and trains, it designated its relay towers as
a new channel of communicative activity—a new Internet access fo-
rum. Once this forum was opened to all with no discernible restric-
tions, BART was not permitted to limit access without meeting strict
scrutiny. The BART restriction fails to meet this level of scrutiny, and
thus violates the First Amendment.
It may seem harsh to force a government agency to sacrifice the
safety of its passengers to protect a seemingly trivial free speech inter-
est. After all, BART has some duty to its passengers to ensure their safe
and expeditious journeys home. Their self-described purpose as an
agency “is providing safe, efficient and reliable public transit ser-
vices.”170 Moreover, the restriction seems a minor inconvenience: a
mere three hours without the privilege of texting a friend or checking
email from a seat on the train. This temporary abrogation of a luxury
good appears to be the very embodiment of a first-world problem.171
Such sentiments hold a certain degree of truth. And perhaps in
the context of the BART facts, the harm to free speech was minimal.
But when our speech rights are curtailed in even seemingly insignifi-
cant circumstances, without a comprehensive speech-protective doc-
170. Cell Service Interruption Policy, supra note 12.
171. See First World Problems, KNOWYOURMEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/
first-world-problems (last visited Aug. 28, 2012).
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trine in place the erosion of the First Amendment is rapid and
permanent.172
There are numerous legislative or administrative solutions that
can balance both passenger safety and free speech interests. Upon col-
lecting public comment and considering the scope and effect of the
Communications Act on government enacted cell phone censorship
measures, the FCC should publish guidelines for all government agen-
cies that offer Internet access to their patrons.173 The California legis-
lature should also seriously consider Senator Padilla’s bill requiring
government agencies to consult a judicial officer before shutting
down Internet service.174 But both of these solutions solve only part of
the problem. The reach of the FCC via the Communications Act is
necessarily shorter than that of the Constitution. And the California
legislature cannot solve a problem of national scope. Technology is
changing as rapidly as ever, and sectoral or piecemeal solutions can-
not adequately preempt the unpredictable and unprecedented free
speech issues that accompany the growth of cyberspace.
Courts should build a fortress around First Amendment rights
and adopt an Internet access forum doctrine. The doctrine should
require that when the government opens access to the Internet to eve-
ryone for the broad and unlimited purpose of using the Internet, the
government may not subsequently restrict access without a compelling
interest and narrowly tailored policy. This solution ensures protection
of the most valuable pro-speech medium the world has known, while
striking an appropriate balance with government interests. Now is the
time to learn from the lessons of the Arab Spring. If we allow our free
speech rights to become luxuries, we may find our first-world
problems look more like these third-world nightmares.
172. See generally Eric Lode, Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL. L. REV.,
1469, 1470–73 (broadly discussing the effect of slippery slope arguments on free speech).
173. See generally Commission Seeks Comment On Certain Wireless Service Interruptions, Public
Notice, DA 12-311 (FCC, Mar. 1, 2012).
174. See S.B. 1160, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2012).
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